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TOWARDS THE ZERO ACCIDENT W A L :ASSISTING THE FIRST OFFICER
MONITOR AND CRALLENGE CAPTAIN ERRORS
Eugen Tarnow

In this article the authority system in the airplane cockpit is related to thirty year old authority studies of Stanley
Milgram. Human errors made in the cockpit are found similar to those made in the authority experiments. It is argued
that up to 20% of all airplane accidents may be preventable by optimizing the monitoring and challenging of captain
errors by the first officer.
INTRODUCTION
In a hierarchical organization, the boss's authority in
the work function can be more or less absolute. In 1963, the
eminent social psychologist StanleyMilgram measured the
strength of the United States society authority. He found
that it was about much stronger than expected a
psychology experimenter was able to make subjects tiny
out orders that led to the simulated injury and death of a
confederate. Such strong authoritytends to create situations
in which errors made by authorities will not be corrected.
In particular, this is the case in the airplane cockpit: a
disproportionate number ofaccidents occur with the captain
flying erroneously and the first officer failing to monitor
and challenge the captain errors.
We make the case that any lack of monitoring and
challenging of the captain by the first officer is due to the
already well documented difficulty of monitoring and
challenging authority in our society. The Milgram
experiments are described briefly, specific connections
between the experiment and the authority structure in the
airplane cockpits are made and using this fiame work an
accident is analyzed more closely using a cockpit voice
recording. We make a numerical estimate of how often
inadequate monitoring and challenging errors results in
, accidents. Finally, we suggest ways to achieve the proper
amount of monitoring and challenging by use of a simple
"monitoring and challenging optimization" technique
during LOFT.
THE SOURCES OF THE CAPTAIN'S
AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES
COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COCKPIT
In a typical commercial airplane codcpit there is a
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captain, a first officer and sometimes a flight engineer. In
this chapter we will limit ourselves to considering the
relationship between the captain and the first officer. We
begin by describing the many sources of the captain's
authority. They include rules, difkrent levels of flight
experience, aviation tradition, military, corporate, and
societal norms and values.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) states that a
captain, nobody else, is the final authority on the airplane.
The CFR sets differential requirements for captains and
fkst officers. For a captain it requires about 1500 h m s of
flight time and for a first officer the requirement is only
200 hours of flight time. Once a first officer llfills the
CFR requirement to become a captain, he or she must also
11fi11 the captain requirements of the particular airline.
Personnel policies provide additional thresholds for both
overall flight hours and flight hours in the particular
aircraft and the pilot also needs to have seniority on the
airline's union list. It typically takes a decade or two to
become a captain on a large airplane. In the NTSB's
accident sample (see below), captains had 3-4 times more
experiencethan their first officers whether measwed by the
historical total flying time (median times of 14,000 vs.
5,100 hours) or the experience in the accident aircraft type
(median times of 3300 vs. 880 hours).
Aviation organizational norms include the individualistic
thinking ftom the historical period of the single-pilot
planes. This tradition devalues the first officer. Thus, the
institution of the first officer is "not hlly developed," and
the latter plays a "distinctly secondary role". Indeed, "in
1952 the guidelines for proficiency checks at one major
airline categorically stated that the first officer should not
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correct errors made by the captain" (Helmreich & Foushee,
1993, pp. 4-5).
Military values enter commercial airlines when pilots
who are military veterans enter the civilian workforce.
These values include "respect for rank, for leaderswho take
charge and act decisively, and for subordinates who
understand that it is usually not appropriateto question the
decisions of their superiors" (Birnbach & Longridge, 1993,
p. 265).
Additionally, the values of a hierarchical corporate
culture contribute to strong authohty relationships. For
example, in a New York Times article, the strength of the
authority of the CEO of a particular airline was indicated
by the CEO's staying power in conjunction with seemingly
extreme incompetence. He would "doze o f ' in meetings
and call the company officers, and even the airline, by the
wrong name (Bryant, 1994, p. 17N).
The Captain's authority can be even stronger in other
societies. Merritt and Helmreich (1996) found that the
statement, 'Senior staff deserves extra benefits and
privileges," elicited a neutral position to slight
disagreement among American captains and first officers
fiom four airlines, but those of a Brazilian airline agreed
with it. The statement, "Crewmembers should not question
the decisions or actions of the captain except when they
threaten the safety ofthe flight," elicited variations between
15 and 93% agreement among pilots in different countries,
and the statement, "If I perceive a problem with the flight,
I will speak up, regardless of who might be affected,"
elicitedvariations between 36 and 98 % agreement. Finally,
the statement, "The organization's rules should not be
broken - even when the employee thinks it is in the
company's best interests," elicited variations between 22
and 76 %. That these statements wry over to actual
differences in behavior seems reasonable.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FINDINGS: THE
DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING STRONG
AUTHORITY
Excessively obedient behavior in the presence of authority
was found in the psychology laboratory by StanleyMilgram
over thirty-five years ago (Milgram, 1974). In these
experiments, a subject, the teacher, is asked by the
experimenter to give electrical shocks to a confederate, the
learner. The stated purpose of the experiment is to
understand how punishment affects memory recall. The
learner first fakes discomfort and as the fske electrical
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shocks increase to dangerous levels, he suddenly becomes
quiet. There are four of Milgram's findings that can help
shed light on inadequate monitoring and challenging in the
airplane cockpit:
1. Excessive Obedience: Milgram found that most
people can be made to inflict intense pain and even kill the
learner.
2. Hesitant Challengjng: The teacher's objections
to giving the learner electrical shocks were o%enhesitant
and easily overruled by the experimenter's replies, such as
telling the teacher that "the experiment requires that you
continue."
3. Lack of Monitoring: The teacher accepts the
authority's definition of the situation, which does not
include the choice of disobedience but only the necessity of
continued obedience. Indeed, in the Milgram experiment
not one out of almost a thousand teacher-subjects came up
with an interpretation leading them to call the police or fiee
the learner (Zimbardo, 1974).
4. Physical Closeness Matters: The strength of the
authority of the experimenter was found to be higher the
closer the teacher was to the experimenter.
In addition, there is the Milgram Prediction Error: It was
shown that predictions (done by psychiatrists, graduate
students and faculty in the behavioral sciences, college
sophomores, and middleclass adults) underestimate the
rate of obedience to authority by a fador of a hundred
(Milgram, 1974)! This Milgram Prediction Error, which
remains the same, keeps organizations fiom addressingthe
issue of how to protect against erroneous authority.
THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING AN
ERRONEOUS CAPTAIN
There are similaritiesbetween the Milgram experimental
situation and the behavior in the cockpit during distress.
We make a simple correspondence between the Milgram
experiment and the cockpit dynamics: the role of the
experimenter is taken by the erroneous captain, the teacher
is the first officer, and the harm to the learner and
everybody else is the airplane crashing.
Observers of behavior in the aviation field have noted the
tendency of the captain-first officer relationship to be too
authoritarian in many instances. Ginnett (1993) writes
about the tendency of the first officer not to question the
captain (here, and later in other examples, I have inserted
the applicable findings of Milgram, mentioned above, in
square brackets):
The authority dynamic surrounding the
JAAER, Fall 2000
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role of the captain must be extremely
powerful. . . . [and] has resulted in
crewmembers not speaking up when
necessary [Hesitant Challengind. . . .
This inclination may also result in
excessive psychological dependence on
the captain as leader to the extent that
individual contributions to problemsolving are neither voiced not attempted
[Lack of Monitoring]. For example, one
captain with whom I flew made a
particularly poor approach ... setting off
numerous alarms. In reviewing crew
members1inactions afterward, the young
second officer (who literallysaid nothing
during the final approach) admitted that
he had never seen an approach quite like
that, but figured "the captain must know
what he's doing" [Lack of Monitorin4
(Ginnett, 1993, pp. 88-89).
A first officer also comments on how difficult it was for
him to convince the captain that an error was being
made:
I was the first officer on an airline flight
into Chicago O'Hare. The captain was
flying .... On our approach, Approach
Control told us to slow to 180 knots. I
acknowledgedand waited for the captain
to slow down. He did nothing, so I
figured he didn't hear the clearance. So I
repeated, "Approach said slow to 180,"
and his reply was something to the effect
of, "I'll do what I want." I told him at
least twice more and received the same
kind of answer mesitant Challennind
.... [Approach Control] then asked us to
turn east. I told them we would rather
not because of the weather and we were
given present heading and to maintain
3000 ft. The captain descended to 3000
ft. and kept going to 2500 ft. even
though I told him our altitude was 3000
ft. His comment was, "You just look out
the damn window." (from a confidential
report submitted to the NASAIFAA
Aviation Safety Reporting System;
quoted in Ginnett, 1993, p. 74).
JAAER, Fall 2000
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Two researchers write similarly about the difficulty of the
firs! officer to get the attentim of the captain that an error
was being made, rekrring to "a co-pilot, concerned that
take-off thrust was not properly set during a departure in a
snow storm, failing to get the attention of the captain
[Hesitant Challenging] with the aircraft stalling and
crashing into the Potomac River" (I-IeImreich and Foushee,
1993, p. 6).
Wiener et al(1993) have classified typical crew errors. If
we investigate this classification we find that several are
related to elements of the Milgram experiment. Three of
these errors may be related to, Lack of Monitoring: '%lure
to set priorities", "inadequate monitoring", and "iilure to
utilize availabledata" A fourth error is related to Hesitant
Challenging: "failure to communicate intent and plans."
(Wiener et al, 1993, p xvii).
A Case Studv With a Cockvit Voice Recording
On December 1, 1993, Express I1 Airlines Inc. 1
Northwest Airlink Flight 5719 descended too quickly and
crashed before it hit the runway in Hibbing, Minnesota.All
sixteen people on board died. According to the NTSB
(NTSB, 1994a)the crash was caused by several Wors: the
captain flew the airplane inappropriately; did not "exercise
proper crew coordination"; the firstofficer did not properly
monitor [Lack of Monitoring] and alert the captain of the
problematic descent [Hesitant Challenging]; the captain
intimidated his first officer; there was inadequate airlime
oversight of the captain, who had a history of intimidating
his first officers; and there was inadequate FAA
surveillance of the airline.
That the captain's authority was strong in the cockpit can
be deduced as follows. The captain intimidated five out of
six first officers interviewed. He had actually h c k one of
them for mistakenly leaving the intercom on, and this fact
had been passed on to the first officer ofthe accident flight.
His first officers never reported the i c t that the captain did
not fly by the book, violated company policies on sexual
harassment, sleeping in flight, and flying with mechanical
irregularities.
The first officer, on the other hand, was a new
probationary employee who '%ad just spent $8,500 of his
own money to be trained for a job that provided an annual
earning potential of $18,000." Such high stakes make it
less likely that such a first officer would challenge a captain
who could have a detrimental elTed on his career.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript showed
that ''most of the captain's communication with the first
Page 3 1

3

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 [2000], Art. 8

Towarak the Zero Accident Goal
officer was either to correct him or to tell him what to do."
Other captains testified afterwardsthat the first officer had
not needed these directions during their flights. Some of
these instructions were even absurd. Further, according to
the NTSB, "the statements of the first officer on the CVR
suggest a tense and almost reserved attitude toward the
captain ~xcessiveObedience].Information providedbythe
first officer to the captain was couched in a questioning
manner rather than as an assertion." [Hesitant
Challenging].
Finally, the airline only provided a kingle approach chart,
which both captain and first officer had to use. This vital
piece of information could only be shared by making the
interpersonal distance minimal, thus M e r increasing the
captain's authority [Physical Closeness Matters].
Here are some excerpts fiom the CVR transcript provided
in the NTSB report. We begin as the captain and the first
officer discuss where they are going to stay that night, a
passage that seems to imply a rather large power difference
between them:
First Officer: it's not the Radisson or anything?
Captain: yeah right.
First Officer: no are you serious with this
thing ..travel?
Captain: no I'm kidding it's the Holiday
Inn.
First Officer: they have a Holiday Inn in .. in ah
1' Falls? so then I assume they have a bus?
Captain: they have a van.
First Officer: and they ah don't care if
it's a four o'clock ah Captain: nope because they're also
taking our people to the airport
besides us.
First Officer: ah (that's right). do we
get our own room?
Captain: no you're going to have to
room with me and it's only a single bed
so there's a little carpet at the base of
my bed and you can curl up at the base
of my bed .. course you get your own
room ... you're under contract now ...
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this is ALPA [Air Line Pilots
Association] contract.
The captain then asks about the time:
Captain: what time were we out of the gate.
First Officer: fifty-two
Captain: okay. according to your watch or
according to the clock?
First Officer: ah well it's the same.
Captain: oh okay.
First Officer: I think I'm showingthe same ..yeah.
The time issue suggests that the First offi& is somewhat
deferentially checking whether his watch and the airplane
clock show the same time.
The first officer keeps asking the captain questions as if
the captain is his teacher: How long does it take to go
between different locations, are there jetstream routes,
where they are at the moment, what the control tower said,
what approach they can take to the airport?
First Officer: okay .. what's the ah see that falling
star?
Captain: either that or a falling Cessna.
The first officer's questions keep coming. He fails to
make standard call-outs for lowered altitudes, and ,
according to the NTSB, fails to call out the need to execute
a missed approach. The captain did not fly the approach
according to the stated plan, but remains at a high altitude
too long, suggesting that the landing is going to be very
steep. The first officer makes one attempt to challenge it:
First Officer: just .. you just gonna stay up here as
long as you can?
Captain:yes. guard the hor- I mean an speeds one
hundred.

When the captain asks the first officer whether Hibbing's
control tower gave him the weather, the first officer affivms
it after a pause even though this did not happen.
According to the NTSB, at the time of the approach, the
captain should have made clear to the first officer what
were his duties. The consequence of his failure is indicated
by a variety oforders given during the approach, distracting
both pilots. At the point the plane is scraping the trees, the
JAAER, Fall 2000
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following dialogue occurs:
Captain: did you ah click the ah airport lights ..
make sure the co-common traffic advisory
frequency is set. [sound of seven microphone
clicks]. click it seven times?
yup yeah I got it now.
First Officer:
[momentary sound of scrape lasting for .1 secs]
The plane crashes.

,

DOING THE NUMBERS: MONITORING AND
CHALLENGING ERRORS
In 1994 the NTSB (1994b) reviewed all serious airplane
accidents between 1978 and 1990 subject to the conditions
that (1) a voice recorder had to be required on the plane,
that (2) the NTSB had conducted a major investigation
(limiting the nukber of accidents to 75), and that (3) the
flight crew's actions were a causal or contributing fictor
(limiting the number of accidents further to 37). Twentythree of the 37 accidents resulted in fatalities.
The NTSB found that after procedural errors, errors of
the type "monitoringlchallenging~'were the most common,
occurring in 80 % of the accident sample. These were
errors in which the non-flying crew-member (the first
officer in 81-87% of the cases) did not properly monitor
and challenge the flying crew-member when errors were
committed. Usually the errors that should have been
monitored or challenged were listed as causal or
contributing to the accident.
Using this data we can calculate how many accidents are
related to inadequate monitoring and challenging.
According to the NTSB in 19 of the 37 accidents a
monitoringlchallengingerror followeda causalerror. Since
the initial pool consisted of 75 accidents, approximately
25% of all accidents could have been prevented by better
monitoring and challenging. Keeping in mind that in 8 1
87% of all the accidents the captain was the flying pilot,
about 20% of all accidents could have been prevented if the
first officer had better monitored and challenged the
captain.
OPTIMIZATION MONITORING AND
CHALLENGING
The NTSB's discussion of human errors included the
need for practicing monitoring/challenging behavior in
LOFT scenarios and emphasizing monitoring and

-
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challenging (M&C) errors in the LOFT debriefing. In
particular, the NTSB felt that an important avenue wouid
be the "intentional introduction of a procedural or
decisional error by the flying pilot in the LOFT scenario.
This techniquewould make certain that thenon-flying pilot
is confionted with the opportunity to detect and challenge
the error made by the flying pilot." This leads us, next, to
propose M&C optimization as a technique.
It is evident for the sake of error correction, that the
degree of M&C is a parameter that should be modified to
some best value between 0 and 100%. The intelligenceand
experience of the first officer should be utilized (high
M&C), while at the same time a structure of hierarchical
accountability needs to be present (low M&C). This is
similar to Edward's conjecture that the trans-cockpit
authority gradient should not be too high, nor too low, but
optimized (Edwards, 1975).
We begin by quantifying the M&C level by introducing
intentional errors on the captain's part. These errors vary
on a scale fiom small to large. Some of the decisions,
whether erroneous or not, will be challenged by the first
pilot and others will not. Each correct challenge will
subtract a number fiom the overall M&C score of the
captain-first officer relationship, while incorrect challenges
and each error not challenged will add a number to the
overall M&C score.
The intentional errors can be introduced at any time
during LOFT. For illustrative purposes, let's introduce
errors on the checklist in Appendix I. The captain's
instructions include the point value of a first officer
challenge. The point value is negative if an appropriate
instruction is challenged or if an intentional error goes
unchallenged and positive if an intentional e m s is
challenged. At the end of the checklist procedure, the total
score is added up and reported to the LOFT control tower.
The M&C score can now be used in three ways: First,
the score can be discussed by the trainer. If the score was
too high, the first officer can be asked to practice and
challenge the captain a m d i n g to a script, while the
captain can be asked to respond to those challenges in
amenable ways. If the score was too low, the first officer
has to be told that the captain is in charge of the plane and
cannot be challenged that much and the captain should be
taught how to deal more effectively with challenges to his
authority.
Second, a database can be made of the M&C score and
the corresponding error rate (itentional or not) during the
Page 33
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rest of the simulation. The expected result would be a
strong correlation of the M&C rate with the unchallenged
captain error rate. Ifthis is proved to be the case, the M&C
rate can be used as a predictor of the error rate and a
checklist such as the on in Appendix I could be used, if the
economics permit, during an actual take-off to prevent
crews in which the captain can make unchallenged errors
fiom taking OE
Third, the regular use of M&C optimization will serve to
create a norm for what orders can be given, and to
encourage critical evaluations of h t k e orders throughout
the flying organization.
If one accepts the figure of 20% of all airplane accidents
as being due to inadequate M&C of the captain by the first
officer, optimizing the authority level of the captain couid
lower the total number of serious airplane accidents by as
much as 20%.

.

CONCLUSION

The captain-first officer relationship in the airplane
cockpit was related to the obedience studies of Milgram. It
was shown that many ofthe &om leading to human errors
in the cockpit are similar to ones that were present in the
Milgram obedience experiments including the lack of
monitoring and hesitant challenging. In addition, the
organizational context, values fiom the corporate and
military cultures, and regulations may have created a
captain role with too much power.
It was emphasized that the amount of the M&C has an

optimal value and that this value should be sought after.
M&C optimization is an application of the Milgram
experiment that measures the crew's M&C level in LOFT
on a scale fiom too low to too high. Feedback into the
social system includes crew debriefing. Organizational
M b a c k includes M&C levels as predictors of expected
error rates, and the setting up of an organizationalnorm for
M&C optimization. It was argued that M&C optimization
may prevent perhaps up to 20 percent of all aircraft
accidents.
Studies of authority dynamics are notorious for their
evoking organizational defenses (Milgram's experiments,
for examples, provoked the American Psychological
Association to forbid the experiments fiom being ever
carried out again). In cockpits, however, due to the high
costs of mistakes, the organizational defenses are lowered.
Helmreich & Foushee, 1993, write in the context of
teaching crew decisions:
...one is struck by the willingness of very
disparate organizations to embrace a training
concept that counters many of the traditions of an
industry.
Finally, we may note that there are many other potential
areas of society in which M&C optimization could be used,
especially in social systems that handle large risks such as
financial trading floors.
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His professional interests include obtaining measurable improvements in organizational contexts whether using computers to
streamline business processes or, as in the present article, using concepts of physics and social science to prevent airplane
accidents.
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APPENDIX
The following checklist is derived from Normal Procedures, Aircraft Operating Manual - DC-9 revision 10 (914195).
4

Additions made by this author are indicated in italics.

r

FINAL COCKPIT PREPARATION

The Final Cockpit Preparation is performed by both crew members in final preparation for flight. This, in conjunction
with the first officer's preflight inspection previously described, prepares panels and related components prior to
initiating the BEFORE START checklist.
The captain's and first oEcer's final cockpit preparation procedures are shown below. If the manner of accomplishment
is described in the BEFORE START expanded checklist, reference is made to the specific item.

INSTRUCTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE CAPTAN:THE A UTHORITYFIELD OPTIMIZATION

Thefinal authority over this plane is yours. Should you make a mistake during theflight, it is imperative,
however, that your error is properly monitored and challenged by thefirst oflcer. Sornetimes,Jirst oflcers will not
challenge their captain. l%eabsence of a challenge can make a mistake more seriom than it need to be. In italics
you will see inauurouriate instructionsyou are to give in order to test the strength ofyour authority. This is the only
known way to find out whether your first oflcer will, in the case of a real error, challenge you. Yourfirst oflcer
should obey all your appropriate commands but challenge at least two of the ones given in italics. You are required
to report the result to the control tower and to thefirst oflcer before take-ofl
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Task

Point value

Check if

of filst

challewed

bv first ~ i l o t

officer
cballenpe

OVERHEAD PANEL..............................
SET AND CHECKED
Fire Detection Panel............................................................ CHECK

-

-1
-1

Check that both engine and APU Fire Detector Loop switches are
I

set to BOTH.
Maintenance Interphone Switch...................CHECK

-

Check that switch is OFF.
Ground Servie Electrical Power Switch............CHECK
The next two checks on your list have been switched to see whether the

-1

first o@er will challenge the apparent skipping of a check If the first
oflcer challenges, thank him or her and say that you made a mistake.
Circuit Breakers.......................................CHECK

1 if missed

-

check

Check all circuit breakers are in or collared. Under most

conditions, the three (3) Anti-Fog circuit breakers will be pulled but not

detected

collared.
Observer's Oxygen Panel.........................CHECK

-1 otherwise

-

-1

Check that Oxygen Lever is ON, Diluter Toggle is set to 100%

and that Emergency Toggle is set to NORMAL.
Winshear Detection System..................
CHECKED

-

-1

Press the WMDSHEAR TEST switch and observe annunciations

indicated in Pilot Manual Chapter 19.

-

Any system failure detected will cause the WINDSHEAR INOP

light to remain illuminated at the end of the test.

-

Aural messages as given in Chapter 19 will accompany any

system failure(s), internal or external.
NOTE

-1

This task cannot be performed in flight.

-

Check that WINDSHEAR INOP light is extinguished.

I
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Towards the Zero Accident Goal

Tell thefirst o@cer you need to leave the cabinfor a minute. Ask him to

5

continue the checklist himselJ:Then change your mind and remain. Take
note of whether thefirst oflcer challenged your initial decision or not.
Voice recorder ....................................... TEST
Press and hold Test switch for at least five seconds and observe
monitor meter indicates in green band.
Electrical Panel.................. SET AND CHECK

-

-1

1

See "Electrical Panel" items in the Before Start expanded

checklist in section N-3.
Galley Power Switch.................... O N or OFF
DC Start Pump........................................
OFF
Ignition.. ....................................................OFF
Cabin Emergency Lights Switch...............ARM

-

-1

-1
-1
-1
-1

Place switch to ARM.

No Smoking Sign Switch............................ON

-1

-

1 if off-

Place switch to ON.

switch

In an absent-minded way, please set the No Smoking Sign Switch to

challenged

OFF. In case thefirst oflcer did not challenge your decision, you will
be reminded later to switch it to ON.
etc.
A UTHORITY FIELD O P T I .TION REPORT TO TOWER

Number of challenges to inappropriate checklist
orders (those with positive values):
Number of challenges to regular checklist orders

I (those with negative values)
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